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Abstract
Many practical search problems concern the search for multiple hidden objects or
agents, such as earthquake survivors. In such problems, knowing only the list of possible
locations, the Searcher needs to find all the hidden objects by visiting these locations
one by one. To study this problem, we formulate new game-theoretic models of discrete
search between a Hider and a Searcher. The Hider hides k balls in n boxes, and the
Searcher opens the boxes one by one with the aim of finding all the balls. Every time
the Searcher opens a box she must pay its search cost, and she either finds one of the
balls it contains or learns that it is empty. If the Hider is an adversary, an appropriate
payoff function may be the expected total search cost paid to find all the balls, while if
the Hider is Nature, a more appropriate payoff function may be the difference between
the total amount paid and the amount the Searcher would have to pay if she knew
the locations of the balls a priori (the regret). We give a full solution to the regret
version of this game, and a partial solution to the search cost version. We also consider
variations on these games for which the Hider can hide at most one ball in each box.
The search cost version of this game has already been solved in previous work, and we
give a partial solution in the regret version.
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1 Introduction
Consider search problems in which a Searcher must find k ≥ 1 balls distributed among a set
of n > k boxes. Each box has a search cost, which is the cost the Searcher must pay to open
the box. If the Searcher opens an empty box, she finds no ball and learns the box is empty. If
the Searcher opens a nonempty box, then she finds just one ball without learning whether the
box contains any more. The objective is to find a randomized search to minimize the worst-
case expected cost the Searcher has to pay to find all k balls. Equivalently, this problem can
be formulated as a zero-sum game between the Searcher and a malevolent cost-maximizing
Hider.
It is natural in many situations that the number of objects found depends on the amount
of effort invested in searching. For example, consider the search for a row of landmines in
a particular site. Since minefields often exhibit regular linear patterns with equal spacing
(Lake and Keenan, 1995), the landmines are found one by one until reaching the end of the
row, whereupon the Searcher learns that there are no more hidden. Another example is
after an earthquake, when the survivors may be hidden in several collapsed buildings, and
the search and rescue team needs to dig deeper in the rubble to save them one by one. A
further example, which comes from the natural world, is that of animals or birds that hide,
or cache, food for later rediscovery (Vander Wall, 1990). Squirrels that bury nuts in the
ground (the Hider) risk those nuts later being pilfered by a competitor (the Searcher).
When the Hider is an adversary—such as an enemy force who plants landmines—it is
reasonable to adopt a payoff function equal to the expected total cost to find all the balls.
The expected total cost, however, need not be the only interesting payoff function to study,
especially when the Hider is Nature. Consider an example with n = 2 boxes and k = 5
balls, and the search cost is $10 for box 1 and $1 for box 2. The Hider can easily guarantee
a total search cost at least $50 simply by hiding all the 5 balls in box 1. But if the Hider
is Nature, then the Searcher need not feel particularly unhappy if she finds all 5 balls by
opening box 1 for 5 straight times without opening box 2 at all—because the Searcher did
not make a mistake. In these situations, a more appropriate objective function is to minimize
the regret—the difference between the search cost and the cost she would paid to find the
balls if she already knew their locations. In economics, there is extensive study on how
people make choices based on regret (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Loomes and Sugden,
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1982; Bell, 1982).
Since the Searcher needs to open the same box several times to find all the balls hidden
there, we call our model a multi-look search game. In contrast, a variation to our model
is one in which the Hider can put at most one ball in each box, so that the Searcher does
not need to look in any box more than once. We call this a single-look search game. By
considering the two different rules (multi-look or single-look) and the two different payoff
functions (search cost or regret), we have a total of four search games. In this paper, we
study three of these four search games, while the single-look search game with search cost
has been previously solved in Lidbetter (2013). Table 1 summarizes the known results for
these four versions of the game.
Table 1: Summary of results.
Search Cost Regret
Multi-look Solved for n = 2 and for equal costs Full solution
(Section 2) (Section 3)
Single-look Full solution Solved for k = n− 1
(Lidbetter (2013)) (Section 4)
Our work falls into the category of search games, on which there is a rich literature; see,
for example, Alpern and Gal (2003), Gal (2011) and Hohzaki (2016) for surveys. Although
many search games are played in continuous time and space, discrete search games are also
well studied. In particular, there has been a lot of work on searching for a single object in a
finite set of hiding locations. In a classic problem solved by Blackwell (reported in Matula
(1964)), the objective is to minimize the expected cost of finding an object hidden in boxes
according to a known probability distribution, where each box has a search cost and an
overlook probability. A game-theoretic version of this game was considered in Bram (1962),
Roberts and Gittins (1978), Gittins and Roberts (1979), Ruckle (1991), and more recently
in Lin and Singham (2015).
Search problems in which there are several hidden objects are less well studied. Assaf and Zamir
(1987) and Sharlin (1987) study a variation of Blackwell’s problem (described above) in which
the Searcher has to find one of several hidden objects in least expected cost. Lidbetter (2013)
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solves a game in which all the objects hidden in a set of boxes must be found in minimum
expected cost. Caching games were introduced in Alpern et al. (2010), in which a Searcher
with limited resources aims to maximize the probability of locating a certain number of
hidden objects. Caching games share a feature of our multi-look games, in that the number
of objects found in a location can depend on how much searching effort is invested.
In some of the games studied in this paper, the payoff function we use is the additive
regret incurred by the Searcher. There is a lot of work in search theory that concentrates
on the multiplicative regret—the ratio of the cost paid by the Searcher in finding a hidden
item to the cost she would have paid if she already knew its location. This type of payoff
function was introduced in search theory independently by Beck (1964) and Bellman (1963)
in the context of the linear search problem, later extended by Gal (1974). The linear search
problem is framed in a continuous setting, but multiplicative regret for search theory has
also been studied in a discrete setting in Koutsoupias et al. (1996) and Angelopoulos et al.
(2016).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4 is each concerned with
a version of the search game as summarized in Table 1. Whereas we solve the multi-search
game with regret in Section 3, for the other two versions we can only derive the optimal
solution in a few cases, and show by examples the complexity of the optimal solution in
general. Section 5 concludes and points out a few future research directions.
2 Multi-look Search Game with Search Cost
Consider the multi-look search game with search cost, as summarized in Table 1. The Hider
distributes k balls among n boxes in any way he wants, including putting up to k balls in
the same box. The Searcher opens the boxes one by one, each time paying a search cost.
For conciseness, we write [n] := {1, . . . , n} for the set of boxes, and let ci denote the search
cost of box i ∈ [n]. If the box contains at least one ball, the Searcher finds one of them
but does not learn whether there are any others in the box; otherwise, she learns the box is
empty. The payoff is the sum of the search cost paid after the Searcher finds all k balls. The
Searcher is the minimizer and the Hider is the maximizer.
Since multiple balls can be hidden in a box, a pure strategy for the Hider is a nonnegative
integer solution to the equation
∑n
i=1 xi = k, where xi corresponds to the number of balls
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hidden in box i ∈ [n]. Hence, the Hider has
(
n+k−1
k
)
pure strategies. The Searcher’s strategy
set is harder to describe. Since the Searcher opens the boxes one by one, she can use the
search history to decide which box to open next. The search history at each stage can
be described by the sequence of boxes that have been opened up to that point and those
search outcomes. As an example, suppose n = k = 2. A possible Searcher strategy could
be described as follows. Open box 1 first; if it contains a ball then open it again, and then
open box 2 if the balls have not both already been found; if box 1 does not contain a ball
then open box 2 twice. Since the strategy set of each player is finite, the game has a value
and optimal strategies. Since the Searcher’s strategy set is much larger than the Hider’s, the
Searcher may have many strategies that achieve optimality. As will be seen in this paper,
the Searcher often has an optimal strategy that does not depend on the full search history,
and will be simpler to describe.
Let Tk = Tk([n]) denote the sum over all products Π
n
i=1c
xi
i , for all nonnegative integer
vectors (x1, . . . , xn) summing to k. That is,
Tk([n]) =
∑
x1+···+xn=k
(
n∏
i=1
cxii
)
.
For instance,
T2([3]) = c
2
1 + c
2
2 + c
2
3 + c1c2 + c2c3 + c1c3.
Consider the Hider strategy, which chooses a pure strategy x = (x1, . . . , xn) with proba-
bility
pn,k(x) =
∏n
i=1 c
xi
i
Tk([n])
. (1)
It is quick to check that this mixed strategy has an important property: whether or not the
Searcher finds a ball after opening a box, the other balls are still hidden according to (1).
It turns out that the mixed strategy in (1) is an equalizing strategy—a strategy that results
in the same payoff against any Searcher strategy. Note that if ci = c for all i ∈ [n], this
strategy simply chooses uniformly between all the Hider’s pure strategies.
Lemma 1 For the muli-look search game with expected cost, against the Hider strategy
pn,k in (1), any Searcher strategy has expected cost
U([n], k) ≡
kTk+1([n])
Tk([n])
. (2)
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Proof. The proof is by induction on n+ k. For n = k = 1, we have
1 · T2([1])
T1([1])
=
1 · c21
c1
= c1,
which is clearly the expected cost, since the Searcher will open box 1 exactly once to find
the only ball, and be done with it.
Suppose n + k ≥ 3 and suppose without loss of generality that the Searcher starts by
opening box n, which costs cn. As noted already, whether or not a ball is found, the remaining
balls will be hidden according to p in (1). More precisely, if a ball is found (which happens
with probability cnTk−1([n])/Tk([n]), the remaining balls are hidden according to pn,k−1; if
a ball is not found (which happens with probability Tk([n− 1])/Tk([n]), the remaining balls
are hidden according to pn−1,k. Hence,
U([n], k) = cn +
cnTk−1([n])
Tk([n])
U([n], k − 1) +
Tk([n− 1])
Tk([n])
U([n− 1], k)
= cn +
cnTk−1([n])
Tk([n])
(
(k − 1)Tk([n])
Tk−1([n])
)
+
Tk([n− 1])
Tk([n])
(
kTk+1([n− 1])
Tk([n− 1])
)
(by induction)
=
cnTk([n]) + cn(k − 1)Tk([n]) + kTk+1([n− 1])
Tk([n])
=
k(cnTk([n]) + Tk+1([n− 1]))
Tk([n])
=
kTk+1([n])
Tk([n])
,
which completes the proof. ✷
A natural conjecture is that the equalizing strategy in (1) is optimal for the Hider.
Indeed, this conjecture is true when the search costs are equal for all boxes, as we will show
in Subsection 2.1. However, the equalizing strategy is not optimal in general, as we show in
Subsection 2.2.
2.1 Special Case: Equal Search Costs
This section presents the solution to the special case of the game where all the search costs
are equal. Note that the single-look version of the game with equal search costs is trivial,
as it has a simple solution where both players simply randomize uniformly between all their
strategies.
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To simplify notation, we normalize ci = 1 for i ∈ [n]. In this game, Tk([n]) =
(
n+k−1
n−1
)
, so
by (2), the Hider can ensure that the value V (n, k) of the game satisfies
V (n, k) ≥
k
(
n+k
n−1
)
(
n+k−1
n−1
) = (n+ k)(1− 1
k + 1
)
. (3)
We will show that the preceding is indeed the value of the game, so that the Hider’s equalizing
strategy in (1) of choosing uniformly between all his pure strategies is optimal. The Searcher’s
optimal strategy is less obvious. A first guess at an optimal Searcher strategy would be to
choose at each stage uniformly at random between all remaining boxes that may contain a
ball. However, this strategy is not optimal, as we illustrate in the following example.
Suppose n = k = 2. The Hider ensures a payoff of (n+ k)(1− 1/(k+ 1)) = 8/3 by using
his equalizing strategy. Consider the Searcher strategy that always chooses a random box
that may contain a ball. If the 2 balls are in the first box, then the Searcher has to pay a cost
of 2 for opening the first box twice. In addition, the probability she also opens the second
box at some stage is 1− (1/2)(1/2) = 3/4. Hence, the expected payoff is 2 + 3/4 > 8/3.
In this example, an optimal strategy for the Searcher is as follows. Open a box at random.
If it does not contain a ball then open the other box twice. If the box does contain a ball,
then with probability 2/3 open it again then open the other box if both balls have not yet
been found; with probability 1/3 open the other box then open the first box again if both
balls have not yet been found. If the 2 balls are in the same box, this strategy has expected
payoff (1/2)(3)+ (1/2)(1+ (2/3) · 1+ (1/3) · 2) = 8/3. If the balls are in different boxes, the
expected payoff is 1 + (2/3) · 2 + (1/3) · 1 = 8/3. Theorem 2 describes the optimal Searcher
strategy for arbitrary n and k.
Theorem 2 For the multi-look search game with equal search costs ci = 1, the optimal
strategy for the Hider is given by (1). The optimal Searcher strategy is recursive. If there
are k balls still to be found and n boxes left that may contain balls, the Searcher chooses
a box uniformly at random, and with probability pj she opens that box until either finding
that it is empty or finding j balls (whichever happens sooner), where pj = λ(k + 1 − j),
j = 1, . . . , n and λ = 2/(k(k + 1)) is a normalizing factor. The value of the game is
V (n, k) = (n + k)
(
1−
1
k + 1
)
.
Proof. Write Γ(n, k) for this multi-look search game with n boxes and k balls. By (3), it
is sufficient to show that the Searcher strategy described in the statement of the theorem
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ensures a payoff of at most (n+ k)/(1− (k+1)). We prove the result by induction on n+ k,
noting that the case with n = k = 1 is trivial.
Consider an arbitrary pure strategy for the Hider, for which there are ni boxes containing
i balls, i = 0, . . . , k. Note that we must have
k∑
i=0
ni = n, (4)
k∑
i=0
ini = k. (5)
With probability ni/n, the Searcher will pick a box containing ni balls. In this case, for j ≤ i,
with probability pj, the Searcher will pay j, find j balls, and will then be faced with the
game Γ(n, k−j), which, by induction, has value V (n, k−j) = (n+k−j)/(1−1/(k−j+1)).
For j > i, with probability pj , the Searcher will pay i + 1, find k balls, and will then
by faced with the game Γ(n − 1, k − i), which, by induction, has value V (n − 1, k − i) =
(n+ k − i− 1)/(1− 1/(k − i+ 1)).
Putting this together, we obtain
V (n, k) ≤
k∑
i=0
ni
n
(
i∑
j=1
pj(j + V (n, k − j)) +
k∑
j=i+1
pj(i+ 1 + V (n− 1, k − i))
)
=
λ
n
k∑
i=0
ni
(
i∑
j=1
(k + 1− j)
(
n + k −
n + k − j
k − j + 1
)
+
k∑
j=i+1
(k + 1− j)
(
n+ k −
n + k − i− 1
k − i+ 1
))
=
λ(n+ k)
n
k∑
i=0
ni
k∑
j=1
(k + 1− j)−
λ
n
k∑
i=0
ni
(
i∑
j=1
(n + k − j) +
(
n+ k − i− 1
k − i+ 1
) k∑
j=i+1
k + 1− j
)
= n+ k −
λ
2n
k∑
i=0
ni(k
2 + kn− k + in) (by (4))
= n+ k −
λ
2n
((k2 + kn− k)n + nk) (by (4) and (5))
= (n+ k)
(
1−
1
k + 1
)
,
which completes the proof. ✷
2.2 Special Case: n = 2
We now relax the assumption that all the search costs are the same, and we will see that
the Hider’s equalizing strategy is not necessarily optimal, even for n = 2. Note that in this
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case, when a search is unsuccessful, the Searcher learns all the remaining balls are hidden in
the other box, so without writing it explicitly, we can assume that after the Searcher finds
a box is empty, she will search in the other box until finding all the remaining balls.
Suppose the Searcher chooses between k + 1 pure strategies, where the pure strategy
indexed by some j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} starts by opening box 1 at most j times. If the Searcher
finds j balls in box 1, then she opens box 2 until finding all balls or finding box 2 empty, in
which case she returns to box 1 to find all balls. If the Searcher finds box 1 empty before
finding j balls, then she opens box 2 to find all the other balls. If the Hider hides i balls in
box 1, and the Searcher opens box 1 at most j times in her first k searches, then the total
cost to find all balls is
C(i, j) =


ic1 + (k − i)c2 + c1, if i < j,
ic1 + (k − i)c2, if i = j,
ic1 + (k − i)c2 + c2, if i > j.
Lemma 3 Consider the muli-look search game with search cost with n = 2 boxes. If
qk(j) = 1−
kck−j1 c
j
2
Tk([2])
≥ 0, (6)
for j = 0, . . . , k, then the Searcher’s optimal mixed strategy is to open box 1 at most j times
with probability qk(j). The Hider’s optimal mixed strategy is given in (1), and the value of
the game is
kTk+1([2])
Tk([2])
. (7)
Proof. First, it is straightforward to check
∑k
j=0 qk(j) = 1. Next, if the Hider hides i balls
in box 1, then the Searcher’s mixed strategy in (6) yields expected cost
k∑
j=0
qk(j)C(i, j) = ic1 + (k − i)c2 + c1
k∑
j=i+1
qk(j) + c2
i−1∑
j=0
qk(j)
= ic1 + (k − i)c2 + (k − i)c1 − c1
k∑
j=i+1
kck−j1 c
j
2
Tk([2])
+ ic2 −
i∑
j=0
kck−j1 c
j
2
Tk([2])
= k(c1 + c2)− k
(
c1c2Tk−1([2])
Tk[2]
)
=
kTk+1([2])
Tk([2])
.
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Since the Hider and the Searcher each has a mixed strategy that guarantees the same payoff
in (7) regardless of what the other does, the proof is completed. ✷
From now on we assume c1 ≥ c2, without loss of generality. Since qk(j) increases in j, it
is a legitimate probability distribution if qk(0) ≥ 0, or equivalently,
−(k − 1) + r + r2 + · · ·+ rk ≥ 0.
where r = c2/c1.
Lemma 4 For m ≥ 2, define
fm(r) ≡ −(m− 1) + r + r
2 + · · ·+ rm.
The function fm(r) has a unique root in (0, 1). Writing rm as the unique root in (0, 1) for
fm(r), then the sequence r2, r3, . . . is increasing.
Proof. Since fm(r) is continuous and increases in r, with fm(0) = −(m − 1) < 0 and
fm(1) = 1 > 0, it follows that it has a unique root in (0, 1). In addition, since
fm+1(rm) = fm(rm)− 1 + r
m+1
m < 0,
it follows that rm+1 > rm, which completes the proof. ✷
In the multi-look search game with expected cost and n = 2, if c2/c1 ≥ rk, then qk(0) ≥ 0,
so Lemma 3 applies and we have the optimal policy. If c2/c1 < rk, then the Hider can
guarantee an expected payoff of at least U([2], k) but the Searcher cannot guarantee the
payoff does not exceed that using the strategy of Lemma 3, which suggests that the value of
the game is higher than that.
Indeed, consider the example c1 = 10, c2 = 1, and k = 2. In this case, U([2], 2) =
2(1000+ 100+ 10+ 1)/(100+ 10+ 1) ≈ 20.0. Consider an alternative strategy for the Hider
of placing one of the balls in box 1 with probability 1, and then choosing where to put the
second ball by using his equalizing strategy (1) for n = 2, k = 1. Since a best response to
this strategy would be to first open box 1 then open the two boxes in any order, this would
guarantee an expected payoff of at least 10+U([2], 1) = 10+ (100+10+1)/(10+1) ≈ 20.1.
The fact that 10 + U([2], 1) > U([2], 2) suggests that in general the Searcher should hide a
subset of the balls in box 1 with probability 1, if c1 is sufficiently larger than c2.
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How many balls should the Hider set aside and put in box 1? If the Hider sets aside m
balls in box 1, and then distributes the other k −m balls between the 2 boxes according to
his equalizing strategy (1), then the Hider guarantees expected cost mc1 + U([2], k −m). It
turns out that the best strategy of this type is the Hider’s optimal strategy, and the value
of the game is
max
m=0,...,k
mc1 + U([2], k −m).
The optimal number of balls to set aside in box 1 depends on c2/c1 through the function
fm(c2/c1), as explained in the next theorem.
Theorem 5 Consider the muli-look search game with expected cost where there are n = 2
boxes with costs c1, c2, c1 ≥ c2. Let b = max{m : rm ≤ c2/c1}. If k ≤ b, then an optimal
strategy for the Hider is given by (1), and an optimal strategy for the Searcher is given
by (6); the value of the game is U([2], k). If k > b, then an optimal strategy for the Hider is
to first set aside k− b balls and put them in box 1, and then hide the other b balls according
to (1). An optimal strategy for the Searcher is to first open box 1 for up to k−b times. If any
of these searches finds box 1 to be empty, then search in box 2 until finding the remaining
balls. If the Searcher finds k − b balls in box 1, then she uses the mixed strategy according
to qb(j) in (6) for the rest of the search. The value of the game is (k − b)c1 + U([2], b).
Proof. If k ≤ b, then c2/c1 ≥ rk and qk(0) ≥ 0, so the result follows from Lemma 3.
Now suppose k > b. Since the stated Hider’s strategy guarantees expected cost at least
(k − b)c1 + U([2], b) (Lemma 1), it remains to show that the stated Searcher’s strategy
guarantees an expected cost at most (k − b)c1 + U([2], b) for any Hider’s strategy.
Suppose the Hider hides i balls in box 1. Consider two cases:
1. i ≥ k − b: The Searcher will first find k − b balls in box 1, incurring (k − b)c1 in the
process. Thereafter, the Searcher uses the mixed strategy according to qb(j) in (6),
which is a legitimate probability distribution, so the result follows from Lemma 3.
2. i < k − b: The Searcher will first find i balls in box 1 in her first i + 1 searches,
incurring (i + 1)c1 in the process, and learns that all the other k − i balls are in box
2. Therefore, the total cost is (i+ 1)c1 + (k − i)c2. To show that this cost is less than
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(k − b)c1 + U([2], b), we take the difference to get
(i+ 1)c1 + (k − i)c2 − (k − b)c1 − U([2], b) = (i+ 1− k + b)(c1 − c2) + (b+ 1)c2 − U([2], b)
≤ (b+ 1)c2 − U([2], b),
since i+1 ≤ k− b and c1 ≥ c2. Writing r = c2/c1, the right-hand side of the preceding
can be written as
c1
(
(b+ 1)r −
b(1 + r + · · ·+ rb+1)
1 + r + · · ·+ rb
)
=
c1fb+1(r)
1 + r + · · ·+ rb
<
c1fb+1(rb+1)
1 + r + · · ·+ rb
= 0,
where the inequality follows from the definition of r and b.
Consequently, the stated Searcher strategy guarantees an expected cost at most (k − b)c1 +
U([2], b) for any Hider strategy, which completes the proof. ✷
2.3 The General Case
We might conjecture that in the general case, an optimal strategy for the Hider would involve
setting aside some number of balls to be placed in the highest-cost boxes with probability
1, and then distributing the remaining balls among the boxes according to the equalizing
strategy in (1). This conjecture, however, is not true, as seen in the following example.
Example 6
Consider the multi-look search game with search cost, where n = 4, k = 2, and (c1, c2, c3, c4) =
(10, 9, 1, 1). Using linear programming methods, we compute the value of the game to be
25.9515. The Hider’s optimal mixed strategy uses seven out of ten pure strategies—except
for (0, 0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1), and (0, 0, 0, 2)—with respective probabilities according to (1), nor-
malized to ensure it is a probability distribution. ✷
The fact that the Hider’s probabilities are chosen according to (1) is significant, and
we conjecture that the optimal Hider strategy always has this property. However, it is not
clear which pure strategies to use in the optimal mixed strategy. Based on the results in
Section 2.2 and Example 6, one may conjecture that optimal policy is to rank all Hider’s
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pure strategies x = (x1, . . . , xn) according to Π
n
i=1c
xi
i , and then let the Hider’s mixed strategy
use d pure strategies with largest such values, for some positive integer d. We conclude this
section with a counterexample to this conjecture, and leave the Searcher’s optimal strategy
as an open problem.
Example 7
Consider the multi-look search game with search cost, where n = 4, k = 2, and (c1, c2, c3, c4) =
(100, 10, 1, 0.99). Using linear programming methods, we compute the value of the game to
be 201.0972. The Hider’s optimal mixed strategy uses the four pure strategies (2, 0, 0, 0),
(1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1), with respective probabilities according to Equation (1), nor-
malized to ensure it is a probability distribution. Please note that c22 = 100 > 99 = c1c4, but
the Hider’s optimal strategy does not use (0, 2, 0, 0). ✷
3 Multi-look Search Game with Regret
This section presents a similar model to that in Section 2, but with a different objective
function. When the Searcher opens box i and finds it empty, we say a regret ci is incurred.
The total regret incurred by the Searcher is the sum of all the regret incurred in recovering
all k balls. The Searcher wants to minimize the expected total regret, while the Hider wants
to maximize it.
First, we prove that the Hider’s mixed strategy in (1) is still an equalizing strategy for
this case, where the objective is the expected regret.
Lemma 8 For the muli-look search game with regret, against the Hider strategy p in (1),
any Searcher strategy has expected regret
V ([n], k) ≡ T1([n])−
Tk+1([n])
Tk([n])
. (8)
Proof. This lemma follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that the expected regret V ([n], k) is
given by
V ([n], k) = U([n], k)−
∑
x
pn,k(x)
n∑
j=1
xjcj
=
kTk+1([n])−
∑
x
∏n
i=1 c
xi
i
∑n
j=1 xjcj
Tk([n])
,
13
where the outer sum is over all Hider strategies x. Hence, it is sufficient to show that
(k + 1)Tk([n])− T1([n])Tk([n]) =
∑
x
n∏
i=1
cxii
n∑
j=1
xjcj.
Without loss of generality, a typical term on the left-hand side can be written cx11 · · · c
xt
t , for
some 1 ≤ t ≤ n with x1, . . . , xt > 0 and x1 + · · ·+ xt = k + 1. Its coefficient is (k + 1)− t.
We argue that its coefficient on the right-hand side is the same. The term appears t
times in the outer sum, with coefficients x1 − 1, . . . , xt − 1. For example, it appears with
coefficient x1 − 1 when the term c
x1−1
1 c
x2
2 · · · c
xt
t (c1(x1 − 1) + c2x2 + · · ·+ ctxt) is expanded.
The sum of these coefficients is (x1 − 1) + · · ·+ (xt − 1) = k + 1 − t, which completes the
proof. Interested readers can also prove this lemma by mathematical induction similar to
the proof for Lemma 1. ✷
It turns out that the equalizing strategy in (1) is the Hider’s optimal strategy, and the
value of the game is given in (8). In Section 3.1, we prove this result by presenting an optimal
strategy for the Searcher that relies on a recursive algorithm. In Section 3.2, we present a
few special cases, where the Searcher can achieve optimality with a simpler search strategy.
3.1 An Optimal Search Strategy
Theorem 9 Consider the muli-look search game with regret. The value of the game with
n boxes and k balls is given by V ([n], k) in (8), for n ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1.
Proof. We use mathematical induction on n to prove this theorem. For n = 1, we have
V ([1], k) = c1 − c
k+1
1 /c
k
1 = 0, which is clearly the value of the game.
Suppose the theorem is true when there are n − 1 boxes, and consider the search game
with n boxes. Let the Searcher deal with box n first. In particular, the Searcher decides the
maximal number of times she wants to open box n, by choosing an integer s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k},
with the proviso that she will stop as soon as a search in box n finds no ball. Let t denote
the number of balls hidden in box n. If the Searcher recovers t < s balls, then a cost cn
is incurred on the (t + 1)th search in box n, and the Searcher knows there are k − t balls
hidden among boxes 1, . . . , n− 1, so the expected total regret becomes cn+V ([n− 1], k− t),
according to the induction hypothesis. If the Searcher recovers s balls, then she puts box
n aside, and uses the policy that would be optimal on boxes 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 assuming n− s
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balls are hidden among those n − 1 boxes. The Searcher will not open box n again, unless
it turns out that fewer than n− s balls are hidden among boxes 1, . . . , n− 1, after incurring
a total regret
∑n−1
i=1 ci. If t = s, then the expected total regret becomes V ([n− 1], k − s). If
t > s, then the total regret becomes
∑n−1
i=1 ci. The payoff matrix is given in Table 2, where
the Hider chooses row t (the number of balls to hide in box n), and the Searcher chooses
column s (the maximal number of times to open box n), for s, t = 0, 1, . . . , k.
Table 2: The matrix game, where the Hider choose the number of balls to hide in box n
(row), and the Searcher decides the maximal number of times to open box n (column).
0 1 · · · k − 2 k − 1 k
0 V ([n− 1], k) cn + V ([n− 1], k) · · · cn + V ([n− 1], k) cn + V ([n− 1], k) cn + V ([n− 1], k)
1
∑
n−1
i=1
ci V ([n− 1], k − 1) · · · cn + V ([n− 1], k − 1) cn + V ([n− 1], k − 1) cn + V ([n− 1], k − 1)
.
.. · · · · · · · · ·
k − 2
∑
n−1
i=1
ci
∑
n−1
i=1
ci · · · V ([n− 1], 2) cn + V ([n− 1], 2) cn + V ([n− 1], 2)
k − 1
∑
n−1
i=1
ci
∑
n−1
i=1
ci · · ·
∑
n−1
i=1
ci V ([n− 1], 1) cn + V ([n− 1], 1)
k
∑
n−1
i=1
ci
∑
n−1
i=1
ci · · ·
∑
n−1
i=1
ci
∑
n−1
i=1
ci 0
Now, we claim that the value of the matrix game in Table 2 is given by V ([n], k) in (8),
and the optimal mixed strategy for the Searcher is to use column s with probability
Ps =
Tk−s([n])
Tk−s+1([n−1])
− Tk−s−1([n])
Tk−s([n−1])
Tk([n])
Tk+1([n−1])
, (9)
for s = 0, 1, . . . , k, where we define
T−1([n]) ≡ 0, T0([n]) ≡ 1,
for notational convenience. Recall that the Hider’s mixed strategy in (1) yields expected
regret V ([n], k) for any search strategy. To prove this claim, it remains to show that the
Searcher’s mixed strategy in (9) yields the same expected regret V ([n], k) against row t, for
t = 0, . . . , k.
Suppose that the Hider hides t balls in box n. The Searcher’s expected regret with the
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mixed strategy given in (9) is equal to(
n−1∑
i=1
ci
)(
t−1∑
i=0
Pi
)
+ V ([n− 1], k − t) · Pt + (cn + V ([n− 1], k − t))
(
k∑
i=t+1
Pi
)
=
(
n−1∑
i=1
ci
)(
t−1∑
i=0
Pi
)
+ V ([n− 1], k − t)
(
k∑
i=t
Pi
)
+ cn
(
k∑
i=t+1
Pi
)
.
Using the induction hypothesis V ([n− 1], k− t) = T1([n− 1])−
Tk−t+1([n−1])
Tk−t([n−1])
, and then using
(9), the preceding becomes
n−1∑
i=1
ci −
Tk−t+1([n− 1])
Tk−t([n− 1])
(
k∑
i=t
Pi
)
+ cn
(
k∑
i=t+1
Pi
)
=
n∑
i=1
ci − cn −
Tk−t+1([n− 1])
Tk−t([n− 1])

 Tk−t([n])Tk−t+1([n−1])
Tk([n])
Tk+1([n−1])

+ cn

 Tk−t−1([n])Tk−t([n−1])
Tk([n])
Tk+1([n−1])


= T1([n])−
Tk+1([n− 1])
Tk([n])
(
cn · Tk([n])
Tk+1([n− 1])
+
Tk−t([n])
Tk−t([n− 1])
−
cn · Tk−t−1([n])
Tk−t([n− 1])
)
.
Using the identity
cn · Tk−t−1([n]) + Tk−t([n− 1]) = Tk−t([n]),
we end up with
T1([n])−
Tk+1([n− 1])
Tk([n])
(
cn · Tk([n])
Tk+1([n− 1])
+ 1
)
= T1([n])−
cn · Tk([n]) + Tk+1([n− 1])
Tk([n])
= T1([n])−
Tk+1([n])
Tk([n])
,
which proves the value of the matrix game in Table 2 is V ([n], k). Consequently, the theorem
holds true for n boxes, which completes the proof. ✷
A byproduct of the proof of Theorem 9 is an optimal search strategy, which relies on a
recursive algorithm.
Search([n], k)
1. Generate a random number, denoted by s, according to the probability mass function
in (9).
2. Open box n repeatedly until one of the following:
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(a) Recover s balls: Run Search([n−1], k−s) on boxes 1, 2, . . . , n−1. If the Searcher
finds fewer than k−s balls in boxes 1, 2, . . . , n−1 (after incurring regret
∑n−1
i=1 ci),
then open box n again, repeatedly, until recovering all k balls.
(b) Recover t < s balls and incur regret cn: Run Search([n − 1], k − t) on boxes
1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
3.2 Normal Search Strategies in Special Cases
In this subsection, we discuss a more restricted class of strategies for the Searcher, which we
call normal strategies. Roughly speaking, a normal strategy sets out a search plan in advance
and does not allow the Searcher to deviate from it by using information acquired during the
search. The advantage of normal strategies is that they can be described concisely, and only
rely on the search history at every stage in a limited way.
A search sequence is a predetermined sequence of box numbers, such that the Searcher
opens boxes following the sequence, with the proviso that she will skip a box if she already
found out that the box is empty. Specifically, it is a sequence of box numbers with length
n · k, which contains each box number i = 1, . . . , n precisely k times. The total number
of different search sequences is (nk)!/(k!)n. A normal strategy is a mixed strategy of these
search sequences. For a search sequence a and a Hider strategy x, we write R(a,x) for total
regret incurred when the Searcher follows a and the Hider follows x.
For example, suppose n = 3 and k = 2, and consider the search sequence a = {1, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2}.
For the Hider strategy x = (0, 1, 1), the Searcher will first open box 1, then she will open
box 3 twice, and finally she will open box 2, giving a total regret of R(a,x) = c1 + c3. For
the Hider strategy x = (2, 0, 0), the Searcher will open box 1, then box 3, then box 2 and
finally box 1 again, with a regret of R(a,x) = c2 + c3.
We make the observation that the order of the first k terms in a search sequence is
irrelevant, since the balls cannot be found until at least k searches have been performed. We
also show that the order of the last k terms in a search sequence is irrelevant.
Lemma 10 For the muli-look search game with regret, changing the order of the first or
last k terms in a search sequence does not change the payoff of this search against any Hider
strategy.
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Proof. We have already noted that the order of the first k terms is irrelevant. To show that
the order of the last k terms is irrelevant, write yi for the number of searches in box i in the
last k terms, where y1 + · · ·+ yn = k. Consider some fixed Hider strategy (x1, . . . , xn).
First, suppose that xi + yi ≤ k for all i. It is straightforward to see that all the balls will
be found before the last k terms of the search, so the order of the last k terms is irrelevant.
Second, suppose that there is some i for which xi + yi > k. For j 6= i, we have that
xj + yj =
(
k −
∑
t6=j
xt
)
+
(
k −
∑
t6=j
yt
)
≤ (k − xi) + (k − yi)
< k. (10)
At some point before the last k terms of the search, the Searcher has looked for a ball in
box j and not found it, so she knew box j has become empty, for j 6= i. Hence, she will look
only in box i in the last k terms, so the order of the last k terms is irrelevant. ✷
We say that the search sequence starts (or ends, respectively) with (y1, . . . , yn), with∑n
i=1 yi = k, where yi denotes the times box i shows up in the first (or last, respectively) k
terms in the search sequence. We make another simple observation.
Lemma 11 Consider the muli-look search game with regret. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
y = (y1, . . . , yn) denote two Hider strategies, and let ax and ay be search sequences that
end with x and y, respectively. If there exists some i such that xi + yi > k, then the regret
function is symmetric in x and y. That is, R(ay,x) = R(ax,y).
Proof. It follows from (10) that xj + yj < k for j 6= i. It is straightforward to verify that
R(ay,x) = R(ax,y) =
∑
j 6=i cj. ✷
In order to prove the optimality of certain normal search strategies in this section, we
will use a simple result also used in Lidbetter (2013), which we repeat here without proof.
Lemma 12 Consider a two-player, zero-sum game between Players I and II with payoff
matrix M , corresponding to Player I’s payoffs. If M is symmetric and x∗ is a mixed strategy
for Player I that makes Player II indifferent between all his strategies, then the strategy pair
(x∗,x∗) forms an equilibrium.
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We now consider three special cases, and present an optimal normal Searcher strategy
in each case.
3.2.1 Special Case: n = 2
When there are only n = 2 boxes, the Hider has k + 1 pure strategies (x1, x2), where
x1 + x2 = k, for x1 = 0, 1, . . . , k. Due to Lemma 10, a search sequence can be delineated
by (y1, y2), where yi is the number of times that box i appears in the last k terms of the
sequence, with i = 1, 2 and y1 + y2 = k. In the notation of Lemma 11, the strategy ay is
uniquely specified, and it is straightforward to verify that
R(ay,x) = R(ax,y) =


0, if x1 + y1 = k,
c1, if x1 + y1 < k,
c2, if x1 + y1 > k.
Since the payoff matrix is symmetric and the Hider strategy p in (1) makes the Searcher
indifferent between all her strategies, the same mixed strategy p is optimal for both players,
by Lemma 12. That is, the Hider and Searcher should both choose a pair (y1, y2) with
probability cy11 c
y2
2 /Tk([2]), which is consistent with the probability in (9).
3.2.2 Special Case: k = 1
Consider the case with k = 1 ball. The Hider has n pure strategies, corresponding to
where to he hides the ball. There are n! different search sequences, each corresponding to a
permutation of the n boxes. Write pij for the Searcher’s normal strategy that chooses each
search sequence that ends with box j with equal probability 1/(n − 1)!, for j = 1, . . . , n.
Write R(pij , i) for the expected regret if the Searcher uses the normal strategy pij , while the
Hider hides the ball in box i, for i, j = 1, . . . , n. One can check that
R(pij, i) = R(pii, j) =
{ ∑
t6=i ct, if i = j,
1
2
∑
t6=i,j ct, if i 6= j.
Hence, the payoff matrix is symmetric between the two players. Since the Hider strategy of
equation (1) makes the Searcher indifferent, by Lemma 12, we conclude that the Searcher’s
optimal strategy is to use pij with probability cj/
∑n
t=1 ct.
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3.2.3 Special Case: k = 2
Consider the special case with k = 2 balls. For every y with y1 + · · · + yn = 2, we will
define a normal strategy Ty that ends with y, such that the expected regret R(Ty,x) is
symmetric in x and y. To describe the search subsequence before the last two searches,
we write σ(A) for a uniformly random permutation of all elements in a set A. For ex-
ample, σ(3, 4, . . . , n)σ(1, 2, . . . , n) means a random permutation of boxes {3, 4, . . . , n} fol-
lowed by an independent random permutation of boxes {1, 2, . . . , n}. For another example,
σ(22, 33, . . . , nn) means that, if the Searcher opens a box and finds a ball, then she will im-
mediately open the same box again, while she follows a random order of boxes {2, 3, . . . , n}
in doing so.
With k = 2 balls, a search sequence has length 2n with each box appearing twice in the
sequence, and a normal strategy is a mixed strategy on these search sequences. We next
give a normal strategy that ensures the payoff function is symmetric. To describe a normal
strategy, we need to specify what the Searcher does before her last two searches, which is
either y = {2, 0, . . . , 0}, or y = {1, 1, 0, . . . , 0}, or some permutation of these vectors.
Definition 13 (A normal search strategy for k = 2) If the Searcher ends with y =
(2, 0, . . . , 0), then she starts with σ(22, 33, . . . , nn). If the Searcher ends with y = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
then she starts with each of the following with probability 1/3:
σ(3, 4, . . . , n), σ(1, 2, . . . , n); 1, σ(33, 44, . . . , nn), 2; 2, σ(33, 44, . . . , nn), 1.
Lemma 14 For the muli-look search game with regret, write x for a Hider’s strategy, and
Ty for the Searcher’s normal strategy in Definition 13. The payoff function R(Ty,x) is
symmetric in x and y; that is, R(Ty,x) = R(Tx,y).
Proof. Up to symmetry, there are 7 cases:
1. y = x = (2, 0, . . . , 0). By definition, R(Ty,x) = R(Tx,y).
2. y = (2, 0, . . . , 0) and x = (0, 2, 0, . . . , 0). The expected regret is
R(Ty,x) =
1
2
(c3 + c4 + · · ·+ cn) = R(Tx,y).
3. y = (2, 0, 0, . . . , 0) and x = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0). By Lemma 11, x1 + y1 = 3 > 2 = k, so
R(Ty,x) = R(Tx,y).
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4. y = (2, 0, 0, . . . , 0) and x = (0, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0). The expected regret is
R(Ty,x) =
1
2
(c2 + c3) +
2
3
(c4 + · · ·+ cn).
Swapping the strategies, compute
R(Tx,y) =
1
3
(
(c4 + · · ·+ cn) +
1
2
(c2 + c3)
)
+
2
3
(
1
2
(c2 + c3 + c4 + · · ·+ cn)
)
=
1
2
(c2 + c3) +
2
3
(c4 + · · ·+ cn).
5. y = x = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0). By definition, R(Ty,x) = R(Tx,y).
6. y = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and x = (0, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0). The expected regret is
R(Ty,x) =
1
3
(
1
2
(c1 + c3) + (c4 + · · ·+ cn)
)
+
1
3
(c1 + c3 + c4 + · · ·+ cn)
+
1
3
(
1
2
(c4 + · · ·+ cn)
)
=
1
2
(c1 + c3) +
5
6
(c4 + · · ·+ cn).
By symmetry, R(Ty,x) = R(Tx,y).
7. y = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and x = (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0). The expected regret is
R(Ty,x) =
1
3
(
2
3
(c5 + · · ·+ cn)
)
+
2
3
(
1
2
(c1 + c2) +
1
2
(c3 + c4) +
2
3
(c5 + · · ·+ cn)
)
=
1
3
(c1 + c2 + c3 + c4) +
2
3
(c5 + · · ·+ cn),
By symmetry, R(Ty,x) = R(Tx,y).
Since R(Ty,x) = R(Tx,y) in all cases, the proof is completed. ✷
Finally, it follows from Lemma 12 and Lemma 14 that the normal strategy in Definition 13
is optimal for the Searcher for the multi-look search game with regret, in the special case
where there are k = 2 balls.
We leave as an open problem the question of whether the Searcher always has an optimal
normal strategy in this game.
21
4 Single-look Search Game with Regret
This section presents a similar search problem to that in Section 3, with the exception that
the Hider can hide at most one ball in a box. Therefore, the Hider chooses k boxes to hide
the k balls, and the Searcher chooses a search sequence, which is a permutation of the n
boxes. The Hider has
(
n
k
)
pure strategies, while the Searcher has n! pure strategies. The
Searcher wants to minimize the expected total regret, while the Hider wants to maximize it.
The problem can also be viewed as a variation to that in Lidbetter (2013), but the objective
here is the total regret rather than the total search cost.
Let Sk([n]) denote the sum over all products Πi∈Aci, for all A that is a subset of {1, . . . , n}
of size k. In other words,
Sk([n]) =
∑
A⊆{1,...,n},|A|=k
(∏
i∈A
ci
)
.
For instance, S2([3]) = c1c2+c2c3+c1c3. Write a Hider’s pure strategy as x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn),
where xi = 1 if a ball is hidden in box i, or xi = 0 otherwise, with
∑n
i=1 xi = k. Consider
the Hider strategy, which chooses a pure strategy x = (x1, . . . , xn) with probability
pn,k(x) =
∏n
i=1 c
xi
i
Sk([n])
. (11)
Our first result is that the Hider’s mixed strategy in (11) is an equalizing strategy. The proof
is similar to that of Lemma 1, and can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 15 For the single-look search game with regret, against the Hider strategy p in
(11), any Searcher strategy has expected regret
W ([n], k) ≡
kSk+1([n])
Sk([n])
. (12)
The Hider’s equalizing strategy in (11) is the optimal strategy in a few special cases.
For example, when k = 1, the model reduces to the one in Section 3.2.2, since it makes
no difference how many balls can be hidden in one box if there is only 1 ball. For another
example, when ci = c for i = 1, . . . , n, then due to symmetry, it is optimal for both the Hider
and the Searcher to respectively choose each pure strategy uniformly random. In general,
however, the equalizing strategy in (11) is not necessarily an optimal strategy. We present
the solution to a special case k = n − 1 in Section 4.1, and then offer a few observations in
Section 4.2.
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4.1 Special Case: k = n− 1
Suppose there are n boxes and k = n−1 balls. The Hider has n pure strategies, by deciding
which one box to leave empty. The Searcher essentially needs to guess which box is empty.
Hence, the Searcher also has n pure strategies, by deciding which box to search last. If the
Hider leaves box i empty, and the Searcher searches box j last, then the total regret is
R(i, j) =
{
0, if i = j,
ci, if i 6= j.
Lemma 16 Consider the single-look search game with regret. In the case k = n− 1, if
qn(j) = 1−
(n− 1)/cj∑n
i=1 1/ci
≥ 0, (13)
for j = 0, . . . , n, then the Searcher’s optimal mixed strategy is to search box j last with
probability qn(j). The Hider’s optimal mixed strategy is given in (11), and the value of the
game is
(n− 1)Sn([n])
Sn−1([n])
. (14)
Proof. First, it is straightforward to check
∑n
j=1 qn(j) = 1. Next, if the Hider leaves box i
empty, then the Searcher’s mixed strategy in (13) yields expected regret
n∑
j=1
qn(j)R(i, j) = ci(1− qn(i)) = ci ×
(n− 1)/ci∑n
i=1 1/ci
=
(n− 1)Sn([n])
Sn−1([n])
,
where the last equality follows by multiplying Sn([n]) = Π
n
i=1ci to the numerator and the
denominator. Since the Hider and the Searcher each has a mixed strategy that guarantees
the same payoff in (14) regardless of what the other does, the proof is completed. ✷
If qn(j) < 0 for some j, then the optimal strategy is more complicated. Without loss of
generality, for the remainder of this section we assume that c1 ≥ c2 ≥ · · · ≥ cn. Since qn(j)
decreasaes in j, it is a legitimate probability distribution if qn(n) ≥ 0, or equivalently,
1−
(n− 1)/cn∑n
i=1 1/ci
≥ 0,
or equivalently,
cn ≥
n− 2∑n−1
i=1 1/ci
. (15)
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Otherwise, if (15) does not hold, then qn(n) < 0, which implies that the Searcher should
never save box n to check last. Intuitively, if cn is too small, then it is not worthwhile for
the Hider to leave box n empty so as to collect a potential small regret. Hence, it is optimal
for the Hider to always put a ball in box n, and for the Searcher to always open box n first.
For example, suppose c1 = c2 = 100 and c3 = 1. The Searcher’s optimal strategy is to open
box 3 first, and then open boxes 1 or 2 with equal probability. The Hider’s optimal strategy
is to put 1 ball in box 3, and the other ball either in box 1 or box 2 with probability 0.5.
The value of the game is the expected regret 0.5 × 100 = 50. If the Hider does not put a
ball in box 3, but 1 ball each in boxes 1 and 2 instead, then the expected regret is only 1,
when the Searcher searches box 3 first.
Intuitively, we can use equation (15) to determine how the Hider divides the n boxes into
two groups. If the Hider chooses somem ≥ 2 and puts 1 ball each in boxesm+1, m+2, . . . , n,
and play a game withm−1 balls and boxes 1, 2, . . . , m, then the Searcher’s equalizing strategy
guarantees expected regret W ([m], m−1). A sensible strategy is for the Hider to choose the
best m to maximize W ([m], m− 1), so the value of the game would be
max
m=2,...,n
W ([m], m− 1) = max
m=2,...,n
(m− 1)Sm([m])
Sm−1([m])
.
We present a lemma before proving this result.
Lemma 17 For c1 ≥ c2 ≥ . . . ≥ cn, define
am =
m−1∑
i=1
1
ci
−
m− 2
cm
, (16)
for m = 2, . . . , n. The sequence a2, a3, . . . , an is decreasing (weakly).
Proof. Take the difference
am+1 − am =
1
cm
−
m− 1
cm+1
+
m− 2
cm
= (m− 1)
(
1
cm
−
1
cm+1
)
≤ 0,
since cm+1 ≤ cm, which completes the proof. ✷
Theorem 18 Consider the single-look search game with regret, and suppose k = n − 1.
Define am as in equation (16), for m = 2, . . . , n, and let b = max{m : am ≥ 0}. The Hider’s
optimal strategy is to first put 1 ball each in boxes b + 1, b + 2, . . . , n, and then hide the
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other b− 1 balls among boxes 1, 2, . . . , b according to (11). The Searcher’s optimal strategy
is to first open boxes b + 1, b + 2, . . . , n. If any of these boxes is empty, then open boxes
1, 2, . . . , b to find all balls; otherwise, use the mixed strategy according to qb(j) in (13) for
boxes 1, 2, . . . , b. The value of the game is W ([b], b− 1).
Proof. With the stated Hider strategy, the Hider guarantees an expected regret ofW ([b], b−1)
regardless of what the Searcher does (Lemma 15), so it remains to show that the stated
Searcher strategy guarantees an expected regret at most W ([b], b−1) for any Hider strategy.
Suppose the Searcher uses the stated strategy, and opens boxes b+ 1, . . . , n first. If any
of these boxes is empty, then the regret is at most cb+1. Otherwise, the expected regret is
W ([b], b− 1). Since ab+1 < 0, it follows that
b∑
i=1
1
ci
<
b− 1
cb+1
,
or equivalently,
cb+1 <
(b− 1)∑b
i=1 ci
= W ([b], b− 1),
which completes the proof. ✷
4.2 The General Case
Because each box can contain just one ball, putting a ball in a box takes away the opportunity
for the Hider to collect a regret from that box, while leaving a box empty allows such
an opportunity. To maximize the total regret, the Hider needs to allocate these n − k
opportunities carefully. If ci is too small, then it is intuitive that the Hider should not waste
an opportunity there to collect a very small regret. The optimal policy in Section 4.1 leads
to a conjecture of the optimal policy. The Hider puts one ball each in the d boxes having
the smallest search costs, and distributes the remaining k − d balls among the other n − d
boxes according to the equalizing strategy in (11). This conjecture, however, is not true, as
seen in the following example.
Example 19
Consider the single-look search game with regret, where n = 4, k = 2, and (c1, c2, c3, c4) =
(100, 10, 1, 0.99). Using linear programming methods, we compute the value of the game to
be 10.0405. The Hider’s optimal mixed strategy uses five out of six pure strategies—except
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for (1, 1, 0, 0)—with respective probabilities according to (11), normalized to ensure it is a
probability distribution. ✷
In the single-look search problem with regret, we again find that the Hider’s optimal
mixed strategy always chooses probabilities according to (11). However, it is not clear
which pure strategies to use in the optimal mixed strategy. One conjecture is to rank
all Hider’s pure strategies x = (x1, . . . , xn) according to Π
n
i=1c
xi
i , and then let the Hider’s
mixed strategy use d pure strategies with smallest such values, for some positive integer d.
Although this conjecture is consistent with the results in Section 4.1 and Example 19, we
give a counterexample below.
Example 20
Consider the single-look search game with regret, where n = 4, k = 2, and (c1, c2, c3, c4) =
(100, 10, 9.9, 1). Using linear programming methods, we compute the value of the game to
be 17.4229. The Hider’s optimal mixed strategy uses (1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1), with
respective probabilities according to (11), normalized to ensure it is a probability distribution.
Please note that c2c3 = 99 < 100 = c1c4, but the Hider’s optimal strategy does not use
(0, 1, 1, 0). ✷
It appears rather difficult to derive the Hider’s optimal policy in general. In all of our
numerical examples, we observe that the Hider’s optimal policy chooses a subset of her pure
strategies, and uses each pure strategy in the subset with probability proportional to that
in (11). It is plausible that the Hider’s optimal strategy always obeys this rule, since it does
not allow the Searcher to learn anything about the Hider’s strategy in the search process.
We leave this observation as a conjecture.
5 Conclusion
This paper concerns a search game in which the Hider distributes k balls among n boxes,
and the Searcher needs to find all balls by opening the boxes one by one. There are four
versions of this search problem, depending on whether the Searcher finds just one ball or all
balls in the box when it is opened, and whether the objective is the expected total search
cost or the expected total regret. As summarized in Table 1, our work complements that in
Lidbetter (2013), and contributes to three versions of this search problem.
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Remarkably, the Hider’s equalizing strategy—in (1) for the multi-look game and in (11)
for the single-look game—does not depend on whether the objective function is the expected
total cost or the expected total regret. In addition, the Hider’s equalizing strategy is the
optimal strategy in many cases. In all examples we examine, where the Hider’s equalizing
strategy is not optimal, the optimal Hider’s optimal strategy is to use a subset of her pure
strategies with probabilities proportional to those in her equalizing strategy. Call this prop-
erty of a strategy the equalizing property. We conjecture that the Hider’s optimal strategy
always has the equalizing property, since in this case, whenever the Hider opens a box, the
remaining hidden balls will be hidden according to a strategy with the equalizing property.
Besides the open problems posed in Sections 2, 3 and 4, there are a few future research
directions. This paper assumes that the Searcher will always find a ball in a nonempty box,
but in practice, the Searcher may fail to find a ball in the box she opens. If the search has
a deadline, then the Searcher’s objective becomes finding as many objects as possible. In
some applications, there may exist geographical constraints on where the Searcher can go
next from her current location. All these extensions are important in practice, but require
substantial new mathematical formulation.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 15. The proof is by induction on n+ k. For n = k = 1, we have
1 · S2([1])
S1([1])
=
1 · 0
c1
= 0,
which is clearly the expected regret, since the Searcher will open box 1 exactly once to find
the only ball, and be done with it.
Suppose n + k ≥ 3 and suppose without loss of generality that the Searcher starts by
opening box n. As noted already, whether or not a ball is found, the remaining balls will
be hidden according to p in (11). More precisely, if a ball is found (which happens with
probability cnSk−1([n − 1])/Sk([n]), the remaining balls are hidden according to pn,k−1; if a
ball is not found (which happens with probability Sk([n − 1])/Sk([n]), the remaining balls
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are hidden according to pn−1,k. Hence,
W ([n], k) =
cnSk−1([n− 1])
Sk([n])
W ([n− 1], k − 1) +
Sk([n− 1])
Sk([n])
(cn +W ([n− 1], k))
=
cnSk−1([n− 1])
Sk([n])
(k − 1)Sk([n− 1])
Sk−1([n− 1])
+
Sk([n− 1])
Sk([n])
(
cn +
kSk+1([n− 1])
Sk([n− 1])
)
(by induction)
=
cn(k − 1)Sk([n− 1]) + cnSk([n− 1]) + kSk+1([n− 1])
Sk([n])
=
k(cnSk([n− 1]) + Sk+1([n− 1]))
Sk([n])
=
kSk+1([n])
Sk([n])
,
which completes the proof.
We note that the lemma could also be proved directly from Lemma 2.3 of Lidbetter
(2013). ✷
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